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ABSTRACT
Extensive adoption of video surveillance, affecting many aspects of
the daily life, alarms the concerned public about the increasing in-
vasion into personal privacy. To address these concerns, many tools
have been proposed for protection of personal privacy in image and
video. However, little is understood regarding the effectiveness of
such tools and especially their impact on the underlying surveil-
lance tasks. In this paper, we propose conducting a subjective
evaluation using crowdsourcing to analyze the tradeoff between the
preservation of privacy offered by these tools and the intelligibility
of activities under video surveillance. As an example, the proposed
method is used to compare several commonly employed privacy
protection techniques, such as blurring, pixelization, and masking
applied to indoor surveillance video. Facebook based crowdsourc-
ing application was specifically developed to gather the subjective
evaluation data. Based on more than one hundred participants, the
evaluation results demonstrate that the pixelization filter provides
the best performance in terms of balance between privacy protec-
tion and intelligibility. The results obtained with crowdsourcing ap-
plication were compared with results of previous work using more
conventional subjective tests showing that they are highly corre-
lated.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.10 [Artificial Intelligence]: Vision and Scene Understanding—
perceptual reasoning, representations, data structures, and trans-
forms; H.5.1 [Information Interfaces and Presentation]: Multi-
media Information Systems—evaluation/methodology, video
Keywords
Privacy protection tools, crowdsourcing, video surveillance, evalu-
ation methodology, intelligibility.
1. INTRODUCTION
The alarming rate at which video surveillance is being adopted
has raised concerns among public and motivated development of
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privacy protection tools. Typical techniques (i.e., filters) used for
obscuring personal information in a video in order to preserve pri-
vacy include blurring and pixelization of sensitive regions or their
masking. More advanced privacy protection techniques have also
been developed recently, such as scrambling [3], encryption of faces
in video [1], obscuring [2] and complete removal of the body sil-
houettes [7], anonymization [6], etc.
However, there is a noticeable lack of methods to assess the
performance of privacy protection tools and their impact on the
surveillance task. While many evaluation protocols and tools (most
notably those developed as part of PETS1 workshops and grand
challenges) are available to test the robustness, accuracy, and effi-
ciency of video analytics for surveillance, little attention has been
given to the privacy aspects. Therefore, a formal methodology for
evaluation of the privacy protection is needed.
Since typical end user of privacy filters is a human subject, the
ground truth required for evaluating their performance is also sub-
jective. In this paper, we propose a subjective evaluation method-
ology to analyze the tradeoff between the preservation of privacy
offered by privacy protection filters and the intelligibility of activ-
ities under video surveillance. We focus on several use cases of
benign and suspicious behavior in indoor video surveillance, and
apply commonly used privacy protection filters, such as blurring,
pixelization, and masking to obscure the privacy-sensitive regions.
Then, we ask human subjects to evaluate the resulting videos in
terms of degree of privacy preservation and intelligibility of the
surveillance events. The proposed evaluation method allows to
identify the weaknesses of existing privacy protection tools and
provide a reference for evaluation of other techniques.
One important objective in organization of subjective evaluations
is getting enough reliable subjects to participate in the study. A
possible solution is crowdsourcing, which is an increasingly popu-
lar approach for solving problems benefiting from large number of
participants. Since evaluation scenario considered in this paper as-
sumes a human guard sitting in a surveillance room and observing
monitors with privacy protected video from surveillance cameras,
the crowdsourcing seem to be a well-fitting and useful approach.
For the crowdsourcing based evaluation, we have built an on-
line application VideoRate2 that utilizes Facebook ID for login and
reliable user authentication. Compared to laboratory based evalu-
ations, this approach allows some flexibility to users, as one could
stop participation in the experiments at any time, as well as simu-
lates the real-time scenario better, since the users evaluate videos
in different lighting conditions and using monitors with different
1IEEE International Workshop on Performance Evaluation of
Tracking and Surveillance (PETS)
2https://ltslinux18.epfl.ch/
resolutions and color settings. We disseminated the call to partic-
ipate in the subjective test using VideoRate application via such
social networks like Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn, as well as
various research mailing lists. With an estimated outreach to more
than 1500, some 120 among them used the application and submit-
ted subjective scores. We then compared these subjective results
with the results from a similar evaluation conducted by a conven-
tional approach in a designated research test laboratory at EPFL.
The results demonstrate high correlation with only some minor dif-
ferences favoring the crowdsourcing method, which means that it
can be considered as a reliable and effective approach for subjective
evaluation of visual privacy filters.
VideoRate application was built using Facebook platform, be-
cause Facebook’s users are generally verified individuals with very
little number of them with fake IDs. Since we disseminated the
application only to either friends, family, or friends of friends, we
have, in a way, propagated trust (since we can trust our friends, and
they can trust their friends). Such measures insured significantly
more reliable results of the subjective tests, compared to a classical
crowdsourcing scenario. Otherwise, we could use statistical analy-
sis for determining the behavioral outliers as presented in [4]. Also,
we used Facebook, instead of such tools like Amazon Mechanical
Turk3, to avoid paying people, which could lead to situation when
people maximize their profits at the expense of honest evaluation
results. Therefore, our evaluation environment is trustworthy and,
by extension, we utilize trustworthy mechanisms to insure that the
results are reliable.
2. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
This section describes the evaluation methodology based on crowd-
sourcing that is designed for effectiveness assessment of the various
visual filters to protect privacy of individuals on one hand, and their
impact on the intelligibility of the surveillance task on the other. We
start with describing the underlying use cases and dataset used in
the evaluations, followed up with details on evaluation protocol and
the crowdsourcing tool.
2.1 Use cases and underlying database
Privacy and surveillance are both heavily context dependent con-
cepts. Therefore, any evaluation methodology should take into ac-
count the context in which the surveillance task is performed. In
this paper, we focus on a simple use case, namely, a monitoring sit-
uation, without recording, where an observer (test subject) watches
a video of an indoor scene under surveillance with a single stan-
dard definition camera. In the monitored scene, individuals move
in front of the camera, either behaving normally, or acting abnor-
mally.
To evaluate this use case, we used a dataset consisting of 9 differ-
ent video sequences with a duration of 10 seconds each. Different
indoor video surveillance scenarios were considered, such as a per-
son walking towards and away from the camera (normal scenario),
blinking into the camera (suspicious), and wearing hat, sunglasses,
or scarf around the mouth (suspicious) to hide personal identity.
Table 1 provides a short description of each video sequence in the
database.
To each video sequence in the dataset, a semi-automatic seg-
mentation and tracking algorithm was applied in order to obtain a
binary mask4, identifying a foreground object of interest, which not
only plays a certain role in the understanding of the situation under
3https://www.mturk.com/
4MIT annotation tool:
http://people.csail.mit.edu/celiu/motionAnnotation/
Table 1: Description of Video Sequences Used in the Evaluation
Seq. 1 White male, sunglasses, walks away and towards thecamera
Seq. 2 White female, walks towards the camera, blinksthree times
Seq. 3 Asian male, glasses, walks in from the right side,blinks three times to the camera
Seq. 4 White male, walks toward the camera, blinks threetimes
Seq. 5 Asian female, walks towards the camera, blinksthree times
Seq. 6 White female, walks toward the camera, blinks threetimes
Seq. 7 Asian male, glasses, walks toward the camera,blinks three times
Seq. 8 White female, walks toward the camera
Seq. 9 White female, wears scarf around her face, walkstoward the camera
surveillance, but also may contain potentially privacy sensitive in-
formation. Different privacy protection filters were then applied to
the extracted foreground objects. Blurring, pixelization, and mask-
ing (black foreground shape covering the region of interest) privacy
filters were selected (see examples in Figure 1) to generate differ-
ent versions for each video sequence. Thus, a total of 27 processed
video sequences were produced and used in the subjective evalua-
tion, as described in the next section.
2.2 Evaluation Protocol and Crowdsourcing Ap-
plication
The overall goal of the subjective evaluation was to assess whether
the detection of the normal or abnormal behaviors in the scene was
possible, while various privacy protection filters were applied. At
the same time, the effectiveness of privacy protection was assessed,
as the identities of the individuals in the sequences might have been
hidden. Particularly, each subject, i.e., the user of VideoRate appli-
cation, was asked to watch a video sequence and then answer to
questions presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Questions Asked During the Assessment
1. What is the gen-
der of the person?  Female Male  I don’t know
2. What is the race
of the person? White  Asian  I don’t know
3. Does the person
wear glasses?  Yes  No  I don’t know
4. Does the person
wear sunglasses?  Yes  No  I don’t know
5. Does the person
wear a scarf?  Yes  No  I don’t know
6. Does the person
blink into the cam-
era?
 Yes  No  I don’t know
An important issue to resolve was the memory effect during
viewing, when observation of a video could potentially affect the
evaluation of a following video. In our case, the main concern came
from interactions between different versions of the same video,
since different details could be visible in different video of the same
scene obfuscated by different privacy filters. For instance, observa-
(a) Original, no filters (b) Blurring
(c) Pixelization (d) Masking
Figure 1: An Example of Video Sequence (Seq. 9 from Table 1) with Privacy Filters Applied
tion of a blurred video could provide information otherwise invis-
ible in the pixelated version of the same video. Consequently, if
the former precedes the latter, the memory effect could affect the
evaluation of the latter.
To avoid such memory effect in the assessment of the privacy
protection and the task performed in video surveillance, each sub-
ject was shown each of the 9 contents only once. To insure that, the
27 processed video sequences were divided into three disjoint sets
designated as A, B, and C, with each set containing 9 sequences in-
cluding all the different contents. Furthermore, every set contained
an equal number of blurred, pixelated, and masked video. Table 3
illustrates how video sequences were divided into these three sets.
A set of video sequences (A, B, or C) is chosen randomly for
each user at his/her first login to VideoRate application. A user is
then presented with a formal disclaimer stating the research pur-
pose of the web application and that the personal data is not go-
ing to be kept longer than the related research activities. Once
a user agrees with the disclaimer, application displays its home
screen with a notice describing the nature of the evaluation and
the suggestion to try a demo video sequence, which helps users un-
derstand how to proceed with the actual evaluation. Then, the user
can choose to press a start button, after which, one of the video se-
quences (randomly chosen) from the preselected set (A, B, or C) is
played automatically. After the video is finished playing, the ques-
tions from Table 2 are presented. The user is asked to answer all
questions by clicking the corresponding radio buttons. Once the
answers are submitted, the user is brought back to the home screen
and can continue to view the rest of video sequences (which will
be displayed in order according to Table 3) from the set until all 9
video sequences are finished.
Video sequences in VideoRate are played at the native camera
resolution 640 × 480 with 30 fps. Videos were encoded with
MPEG-4 and placed in Ogg Vorbis and MP4 file formats to sup-
port the playback by different browsers. The application is able
to correctly run on most of the commonly used browsers including
mobile versions, except Internet Explorer 6 and 7, since they do not
support HTML5, which was used in VideoRate.
A few important aspects of the evaluation process should be
noted. No video controls are given to the user while a video se-
quence is played automatically, thus, preventing user from stop-
ping a video to view it in details. Once a video sequence is played,
it cannot be played again. Such restrictions allow us to simulate the
studied real-time video surveillance scenario. By randomly choos-
ing a set of 9 video sequences and which video from this set to play
first, we insuring an equal chance for each of the total 27 video
sequences to be evaluated by subjects. Also, such arrangement in-
sures that every user has a balanced overview of the used privacy
filters, which helps avoiding bias in the results. The application al-
lows the user to stop the evaluation session at any time. When the
user later returns back to the application, it is possible to continue
evaluating the remaining (those that are not played yet) video se-
quences form the set. In case a video was already played, but no
answers were submitted, it will not be counted towards evaluation
results.
Table 3: The Arrangements of the Filtered Video Sequences into
Evaluation Sets A, B, and C
Seq. Blurring Pixelization Masking
Seq. 1 A C B
Seq. 2 B A C
Seq. 3 C B A
Seq. 4 A C B
Seq. 5 B A C
Seq. 6 C B A
Seq. 7 A C B
Seq. 8 B A C
Seq. 9 C B A
Figure 2: A Photo of VideoRate Application Running on iPad.
3. EVALUATION CRITERIA
Given the context dependent nature of privacy and intelligibil-
ity, in the surveillance scenario under consideration, the first three
questions from the Table 2 are assumed to be relevant to privacy and
the last three questions to intelligibility. Information about gender,
race, and glasses (first three questions) are privacy related. These
characteristics do not carry anything unusual, given the surveillance
scenario, while they can be used to identify people in the indoor
environment, and they can be discriminated against based on these
features. Therefore, such privacy features should not be recogniz-
able to the observers. On the other hand, blinking three times into
the camera, which looks like a sort of secret code (at least, it’s
an unusual behavior), sunglasses worn indoor (possibly for hiding
eyes), and scarf around the face (to hide the identity) are considered
unusual and alarming, since neither of these characteristics are typ-
ical for an indoor environment. These unusual features therefore
are set as related to intelligibility and should be visible to the ob-
servers.
Therefore, the following criteria is used for understanding how
well a given filter protects privacy. If an observer correctly answers
the privacy related question for a given video sequence and privacy
protection filter, the privacy is not protected in this case. Incorrect
answer or no answer (option “I don’t know”) means that the privacy
is preserved. For intelligibility, on the other hand, a correct answer
to the corresponding question means that surveillance task can be
performed successfully, while incorrect or uncertain answers leads
to the failure of recognizing an important unusual event.
Such tradeoff between privacy and intelligibility can be used
to compare different privacy protection techniques and understand
how these techniques perform, given various video contents.
If an observer correctly answers to the privacy related question,
the privacy value is 0, since the privacy was not protected in this
case. Incorrect answer or no answer (option “I don’t know”) yield
1. Then, the average privacy score of all three privacy related ques-
tions across all test subjects is computed for each type of filter and
each video sequence. For intelligibility, it is reversed: correct an-
swers to intelligibility related questions result in value 1 and incor-
rect or no answer in value 0.
4. EVALUATION RESULTS
More than 1500 people were reached out with a call for partic-
ipation in the online crowdsourcing evaluation via several social
networks, such as Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn, as well as sev-
eral research mailing lists. The total number of people that ended-
up using VideoRate application was 120, which was achieved over
the course of 7 days from when the application was released to the
public.
As mentioned earlier, each user could only view one out of three
sets of video sequences, therefore, the number obtained evaluations
scores per filtered video oscillated between 33 to 43, with average
38 subjects providing a score for each video. It can be noticed that
not all users completed their sets of video sequences, otherwise
all video sequences would be evaluated by about 40 subjects (120
total divided by 3). Among all users, 22 were female. Participants
had highly diversified ethnical and cultural backgrounds with well
distributed geographical locations. The age of the users varied from
twenties up to late forties.
For each privacy filter, the aggregated results are illustrated on
a two dimensional space in Figure 3, with the amount of privacy
preservation and the degree of recognition of activities under surveil-
lance (i.e., intelligibility), as vertical and horizontal axes respec-
tively. The privacy score is ranging from 0 (no privacy protection)
to 1 (fully protected), which is the average of the scores of the pri-
vacy related questions from the test subjects, as described in the
previous section. Each point in the figure corresponds to a different
video sequence and a different privacy protection filter. Points cor-
responding to a privacy filter are marked with distinguishing point-
style.
The best privacy preserving filter would be a blacked out camera
with no video feed, but, in such a case, there would be no surveil-
lance possible and intelligibility would be zero. Therefore, a usable
privacy protection filter should have a balance between privacy and
intelligibility. In an ideal situation, the evaluation scores for such
filter would lie in the top right corner of the tradeoff graph, having
the highest values of privacy and intelligibility.
Figure 3, with evaluation scores of the typical privacy filters,
demonstrates that blurring filter yields the highest intelligibility
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Figure 3: Intelligibility vs. Privacy for Different Filters from
Crowdsourced Data
while providing the lowest privacy protection. Not surprisingly, the
masking filter shows the highest privacy protection, while having
the lowest intelligibility, since a person from the video sequence
is replaced with a black silhouette. However, the highest privacy
score for the masking filter is still below 0.8, which means that at
least 20% of the answers to the privacy questions were still correct.
By looking into details, we noticed that the largest number of cor-
rect answers for masking filter is to the gender question, which is
because people can recognize gender by the shape of a person in the
video. Therefore, the shape of persons’ masks should be distorted
to hide the actual shape of the person. A surprising result shows
pixelization filter demonstrating high privacy protection while still
yielding high degree of the activities recognition, which makes it
the filter with the best balance of privacy and intelligibility.
It can be noted in Figure 3 that one video sequence demonstrates
an odd results for every filter, having the smallest value of privacy
and a significantly high intelligibility (the points of each different
color with the lowest privacy scores). In this video, the face of
the person walking from a distance was left visible (unprotected by
a filter) just for a couple of frames, which immediately rendered
privacy protection filters useless. This video sequence indicates
that even a slight inaccuracy or inconsistency in the way the filters
are applied can lead to the complete loss of the privacy protection
effort.
Figure 4 demonstrates the effect of different privacy protection
filters on the uncertainty and incorrectness in the answers of the test
subjects. Uncertainty axis reflects the average normalized amount
of “I don’t know” answers, which were given to both privacy and
intelligibility questions. Incorrectness is computed as normalized
average of wrong answers, when subjects were certain but wrong.
Each point on the graph corresponds to one video sequence dis-
torted by one privacy protection filter. This figure shows masking
filter yielding the largest uncertainty, while blurring filter results in
the largest false positive (incorrectness). Such unbalance indicates
that blurring filter is less applicable in the surveillance scenarios
with little tolerance for false positives. The masking filter on the
other hand would be better in a typical surveillance system when
some uncertainty can be tolerated, i.e., an uncertain observation can
be checked via other means, such as an additional security check,
but false positive is required to be low.
4.1 Comparing with Conventional Evaluations
Similar to the described crowdsourcing evaluations with Video-
Rate application, the set of subjective tests of visual privacy filter
was performed previously in a designated evaluation laboratory [5].
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Figure 4: Uncertainty vs. Incorrectness for Different Filters from
Crowdsourced Data
Only 36 subjects participated in these offline tests with 12 subjects
evaluating each video sequence. To understand the differences and
consistencies between conventional laboratory testing and crowd-
sourcing approaches, in this section, we compare both sets of eval-
uation scores.
There are few notable differences in how offline and online ex-
periments were conducted, which may affect the final evaluation
results:
• In offline case, several subjects (up to 6) were seated in desig-
nated laboratory controlled environment for subjective tests
with the only task to evaluate video sequences, while in on-
line experiments, users watch video sequences at their con-
venient time and place.
• In the offline evaluations, video sequences were played at
fullscreen 1280 × 1024 resolution compared to 640 × 480
camera resolution played online.
• Subjects were given strictly 25 seconds to answer the ques-
tions after each video sequence in the offline tests, while no
such constraints were imposed in online experiments.
We plot evaluation scores of online tests vs. offline tests on Fig-
ures 5 and 6 for privacy and intelligibility related questions respec-
tively. Points corresponding to blurring, pixelization, and masking
privacy filters are marked with different point-styles. These figures
demonstrate that scores of online and offline evaluations are highly
consistent with each other, especially in the case of privacy, since
the points fit to the diagonal lines of the figures quite well. To have
a better understanding of this correlation, we also computed Spear-
man and Pearson correlation coefficients presented in Table 4. The
high values of Spearman and Pearson indicate high correlation of
the corresponding scores.
It can be noted however that there is a higher correlation of the
privacy scores compared to the intelligibility scores. Spearman co-
efficient for the intelligibility of pixelization privacy filter is es-
pecially low. If we analyze Figures 5 and 6 in more details, we
can notice that privacy points mostly lie above the diagonal line,
while intelligibility lie below the diagonal. It means that the par-
ticipants in the offline tests were more accurate in general. Such
tendency can be explained by the larger resolution of the played
video sequences in offline tests (1280× 1024) compared to online
(640 × 480), which allowed offline participants to notice finer de-
tails in the video sequences. And since intelligibility is based on
the questions requiring notice of the finer details than privacy (i.e.,
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Figure 5: Privacy of Online vs. Offline Evaluations
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Figure 6: Intelligibility of Online vs. Offline Evaluations
blinking, see Table 2), the intelligibility scores of online evaluation
deviate from the offline counterparts more significantly.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper defines a crowdsourcing online based methodology
for evaluation of privacy protection tools for video surveillance. In
the proposed evaluation protocol, we focus on two important as-
pects: (i) how much of the privacy is protected by such tool and
(ii) how much it impacts the efficiency of the underlying surveil-
lance task (intelligibility). The pixelization filter shows the best
performance in terms of balancing between privacy protection and
allowing high intelligibility. Masking filter, on the other hand,
demonstrates the highest privacy protection with low incorrectness
and high uncertainty, which can be suitable for the higher security
surveillance applications.
The results of the online crowdsourcing subjective evaluations
were also compared with results obtained from offline tests con-
ducted in a laboratory under controlled environment. In general,
there is high correlation between these two sets of results, with
online results demonstrating a more modest accuracy specifically
for intelligibility scores, which rely on observations of finer visual
details. Overall, the crowdsourcing based results are more prefer-
Table 4: Pearson and Spearman Correlation Coefficients of the Re-
sults from Online and Offline Evaluations.
Aspects Filters Pearson Spearman
privacy
blurring 0.85 0.82
masking 0.94 0.92
pixelization 0.98 0.97
intelligibility
blurring 0.66 0.61
masking 0.98 0.85
pixelization 0.82 0.56
able, because the evaluation setup simulates the real-life surveil-
lance scenario better, and it is easier and faster to get large number
of diverse participants.
Future work includes extending the set of evaluation questions to
identify other tradeoffs in privacy protection. The effect of applying
protection tools with different levels of strength also need to be
evaluated. We also plan to extend the dataset to include both more
content and several additional privacy filtering tools.
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